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Abstract
There is no matching mechanism that satisfies integration monotonicity and
stability. If we insist on integration monotonicity, not even Pareto optimality
can be achieved: the only option is to remain segregated.
A weaker monotonicity condition can be combined with Pareto optimality
but not with path independence, which implies that the dynamics of social
integration matter.
If the outcome of integration is stable, integration is always approved
by majority voting, but a non-vanishing fraction of agents always oppose
segregation. The side who receives the proposals in the deferred acceptance
algorithm suffers significant welfare losses, which nevertheless become negligible
when societies grow large.
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1. Our Problem and its Relevance
Imagine several completely isolated communities that match within themselves, but
that could expand their boundaries to merge and match as a unified community
instead. The question I ask is whether every person would prefer that all communities
integrate as one, provided that the matching outcome is either stable or efficient.
Some examples that motivate my research question are:
1. Interracial marriage. Three infamous cases of societies that banned interra-
cial marriage are i) the U.S. before the Virginia vs Loving case in 1967 (Arrow,
1998; Fryer, 2007), ii) Nazi Germany, where the marriage between arians and
non-arians was forbidden (Caestecker and Fraser, 2008), and iii) South Africa
during the apartheid era, when the the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act
was established (Hyslop, 1995).
In all cases, social integration occurred only after complicated social movements,
and without unanimous approval.
2. Centralized Kidney Exchange. After 2000, kidney exchanges began to
take place internally in hospitals around the U.S. Few years after, centralized
programs started to conduct regional kidney exchanges by asking hospitals to
share their donor-patient pairs. Using a centralized procedure would always
weakly increase the number of transplants, yet it has been noticed that some
hospitals may not have incentives to integrate into to the central clearinghouse,
preferring to conduct exchanges only internally. The aforementioned rejection
to integrate to a centralized clearinghouse has been documented in practice
(Ashlagi and Roth, 2014).
3. School Desegregation In 1954, school segregation was declared illegal in
the U.S. following the Brown vs Board of Education case. Although the
desegregation ruling was widely acknowledged as a major accomplishment, it
was not well-received by some. A shameful example is the resistance by the
governor of Arkansas, who tried to prevent a few Black students from attending
a newly desegregated school. The students were able to enter the school only
when they were escorted by federal forces (U.S. Commission of Civil Rights,
1977).
All these examples show instances on which social integration was complicated to
achieve in matching environments. I formalize these environments with an extended
version of the Gale and Shapley (1962) matching problem with non-transferable
utility. The idea of the model is simple: we take several classical Gale-Shapley
problems and find their segregated women-optimal stable partner. Then we put
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them together and compute the integrated women-optimal stable matching, and
compare who prefers the integrated matching to the segregated one. Stability is
natural requirement to ask for, because decentralized matching environments produce
outcomes close to those predicted by stability (Hitsch et al., 2010; Banerjee et al.,
2013), and because centralized mechanisms that produce stable outcomes are widely
regarded as successful (Roth, 2002).
I derive several impossibilities showing that social integration cannot benefit
everyone whenever the matching outcome is stable or efficient. The impossibility
disappears when only weak integration monotonicity and Pareto efficiency are re-
quired. I also prove that social integration is always approved by a weak majority of
the population.
Interestingly, such majority rarely surpasses 80% of the population when consider-
ing random instances of matching problems, emphasizing the complicated dynamics
of desegregation, and making evident that a non-vanishing minority may oppose
social integration because they foresee that they will be worse off belonging to an
integrated community. Also interestingly, the welfare losses for those who oppose
integration become negligible with respect to the size of the grand society as com-
munities grow large, but in small societies the side who receives the proposals in
the deferred acceptance algorithm suffers significant welfare losses. Finally, it is
also surprising that those who oppose integration are indistinguishable in terms of
expected ranking from those who prefer integration.
I use a one-to-one matching framework, but all the impossibility results obviously
extend to the many-to-one matching case. Since the interracial marriage example is
the one closer to one-to-one matching, I will present the model in those terms, but
the reader should keep in mind that the results apply to general matching problems.
After reviewing the related literature in Section 2, Section 3 introduces the model
and defines the integration monotonicity property. Section 4 presents several impos-
sibility theorems regarding the existence of integration monotonic matchings that
have also any degree of efficiency, emphasizing the rigid structure that monotonicity
imposes in matching problems.
Section 5 details the limits of our impossibility results, showing that although
some agents oppose social integration, they are always a minority. It also describes
the size of such group when the societies become large. Section 6 explores the
properties of those who oppose integration and their welfare loss. Finally, section 7
concludes.
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2. Related Literature
2.1 Comparative Statics in Matching Problems
Within the matching literature, there is a body of work that studies how the set of
stable outcomes changes when a new agent joins an existing society. The main result
in this literature is that, when a new man joins a stable matching problem, every
women weakly improves, while every man becomes weakly worse off. This result is
robust to various formulations of the problem such as many-to-one extensions and
preferences determined by choice functions: see theorem 5 in Kelso and Crawford
(1982), theorems 2.25 and 2.26 in Roth and Sotomayor (1992), theorems 1 and 2 in
Crawford (1991), and theorem 2 in Chambers and Yenmez (2017).
The aforementioned welfare loss that men suffer when a new men joins the
problem has been recently quantified, by assigning agents with independent random
preferences over all their partners. Pittel (1989) shows that, in expectation, the side
of the society that proposes in the deferred acceptance algorithm, say men, gets
matched to a woman ranked log(n) in his preference list, whereas women get in
expectation a man in the n
log(n)
position of their rank. The convention is that the
partner ranked as 1 is the best possible partner, and so on, and there are n potential
partners for each gender.
Using the same probabilistic framework as Pittel, Ashlagi et al. (2017) find that
just by adding an additional man, men receive a partner ranked n
log(n)
with high
probability (in the men-optimal matching), whereas women will receive someone
close to log(n). Interestingly, all stable marriages are similar whenever societies are
even slightly unbalanced in their ratio between men and women.
In all cases, the discussion centers on what happens when adding an individual
alone to a society and not when merging isolated societies of same size. This is my
main contribution with respect to the surveyed literature.
2.2 Integration and Population Monotonicity Elsewhere
Chambers and Hayashi (2017) introduced integration monotonicity and derived
similar results for economic integration. They consider several exchange economies,
in which each agent has an initial endowment, that integrate as one. They find that
there is no path-independent exchange mechanism that is integration monotonic and
Pareto efficient. If the integration mechanism is Pareto efficient and satisfies the
additional property of equal treatment of equals, it must necessarily harm one third
of all agents in the economy.
Sprumont (1990) considers population monotonic schemes in cooperative games
with transferable utility. An allocation scheme is population monotonic if each time
an agents joins an existing problem, the payoff for every existing member increases.
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He shows that every convex game admits a population monotonic allocation scheme,
and provides a tighter characterization using linear combinations of games with veto
control. His work deals with transferable utility games only.
Related population monotonicity concepts in cooperative games are widely used
in different environments, based on the seminal work of Moulin and Thomson
(Thomson (1983), Moulin (1990, 1992); Moulin and Thomson (1988)). This paper’s
title is inspired on the last of those articles. As in the matching literature, all these
monotonicity concepts deal with adding an agent to a problem instead of merging
problems of the same size. Sprumont (2008) presents a detailed review of the work
in this area.
3. Model
Let Sk be a society of race k that consist of n men Mk and n women W k. I refer to
man i (woman j) that belongs to society k by mki (w
k
j ). When I refer to an agent of
arbitrary gender I use xki ; I omit the subindices when n = 1. There are r ≥ 2 races
and R = {1, . . . , r}. For any subset T ⊆ R, let MT = ⋃k∈T Mk, W T = ⋃k∈T W k,
and ST = MT ∪W T . SR is called the grand society.
Each man (woman) has strict preferences over the entire set of women WR (men
MR) and not only over those belonging to her own race. I represent the preferences
of an arbitrary person xki by P (x
k
i ). F (x
k
i ) denotes the weak preference relation
associated to P (xki ) so that for any two agents y
l
j and z
e
g, y
l
j F (x
k
i ) z
e
g if and only
if ylj P (x
k
i ) z
e
g or y
l
j = z
e
g. I assume that every person prefers matching with any
potential partner of the opposite gender than remaining alone.
P T will denote the preference lists of every person in ST ⊆ SR. The pair (SR, PR)
is an interracial matching problem (IMP).
A matching µ : MR ∪WR × 2R →MR ∪WR is a mapping such that, ∀T ⊆ R,
∀mki ∈MT , µ(mki , T ) ∈ W T (1)
∀wki ∈ W T , µ(wki , T ) ∈MT (2)
∀xki ∈ ST , µ(µ(xki , T ), T ) = xki (3)
so that every man is married to a woman in the specified society ST and vice versa.
The function µ indicates who marries whom under every union of races. Naturally,
µ(xki , T ) is only defined whenever x
k
i ∈ T .
In the majority of matching literature, a matching is defined instead as a mapping
µ′ : M ∪W →M ∪W . My definition of µ corresponds to the one of an allocation
scheme of the matching µ′, as defined by Sprumont (1990), which specifies a matching
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µ′ for each subset of R. For convenience, I just refer to such allocation scheme as a
matching.
Let T and Q be an arbitrary partition of R, with T = {a, b, . . . , r′}. Let the
colorblind equivalent of ST be denoted by ST , in which every agent xki ∈ ST
becomes of a new race ab . . . r′, and in which the preferences of each agent in SR
remain the same up to the renaming in agents’ race.
We define the following properties of interest for an arbitrary matching µ, given
an IMP.
Pareto Optimality There is no different matching µ′ such that, for all T ⊆ R and
all xki ∈ ST
µ′(xki , T ) F (x
k
i ) µ(x
k
i , T ), (4)
and for some Q ⊆ R and some ylj ∈ SR ,
µ′(ylj, Q) P (y
l
j) µ(y
l
j, Q) (5)
Pareto optimality is a classical requirement and a basic efficiency concern. It can
be strengthened to the stronger efficiency concept of stability.
Stability For every subset T ⊆ R, and for every mki , wlj ∈ ST , such that
mki /∈ µ(wlj, T ) and wlj /∈ µ(mki , T ) (6)
either
µ(mki , T ) P (m
k
i ) w
l
j or µ(w
l
j, T ) P (w
l
j) m
k
i (7)
Stability is an important requirement because it closely predicts realized outcomes
in decentralized environments and because if the final outcome was not stable, it
would be unlikely that it lasted long from a game-theoretical perspective.1 Now we
turn to integration monotonicity.
Integration Monotonicity For all disjoint subsets T,Q ⊆ R, and for every xki ∈ ST
µ(xki , T ∪Q) F (xki ) µ(xki , T ) (8)
Note that integration monotonicity not only requires that the matching obtained
when all races have integrated is better than the one obtained with a society alone.
It requires that anytime another race joins, it always benefits every agent in the
existing societies. We will relax this requirement in Section 5. Finally, we define
path independence.
1For example, realized romantic pairings are similar to those predicted by stability, see Hitsch
et al. (2010) and Banerjee et al. (2013). Stability is also related to the successful operation of
centralized matching mechanisms such as kidney exchanges programs and school choice (Roth,
2002).
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Path Independence For all disjoint subsets T,Q ⊆ R, and for every xki ∈ SR
µ(xki , T ∪Q) = µ(xki , T ∪Q) (9)
where T denotes the colorblind equivalent of T .
Path independence is a more technical requirement, but nevertheless relevant
because if a matching violates path independence, the dynamics of integration would
play a role in determining the final pairings.
From our four properties, only stability and Pareto optimality are related.2
Lemma 1. Every stable matching is Pareto optimal.
Proof. Let µ be stable. Therefore in any alternative matching µ′ that is better for
person xki at T ⊆ R, we have that µ(µ′(xki , T ), T ) P (µ′(xki , T )) xki , which means
the new partner of xki prefers matching µ to µ
′ at T , and hence µ′ is not a Pareto
improvement.
The converse statement is clearly not true.
4. Results
Unfortunately, stability and integration monotonicity are not compatible even with
just two societies with two persons each.3
Proposition 1. Not every IMP admits a matching that satisfies stability and inte-
gration monotonicity.
Proof. (Example 1) Let R = {a, b} and n = 1, and let agents’ preferences be
ma : wa P (ma) wb wa : mb P (wa) ma
mb : wa P (mb) wb wb : mb P (wb) ma
The unique stable matching has µ(mk, {k}) = wk for k ∈ {a, b} but µ(wa, R) =
mb and µ(wb, R) = ma. Yet µ violates integration monotonicity for ma because
µ(ma, {a}) P (ma) µ(ma, R). The same occurs for wb.
Given that stability and integration monotonicity are incompatible, an obvious
question is whether we can weaken any of those two properties to avoid the impos-
sibility. To address it, let us define a particular matching, called the segregated
matching.
2In exchange economies integration monotonicity and efficiency imply core stability (Lemma 2
in Chambers and Hayashi (2017)). A similar conclusion applies in the housing model of Shapley
and Scarf (1974). For two-sided matching that relationship does not hold.
3Sprumont (1990) proves a similar result: any assignment game with two men and two women
lacks a population monotonic assignment scheme. His result does not imply any of mines because
his works deals with transferable utility games only.
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Let λ be a matching such that λ(xki , T ) assigns to each agent x
k
i the women-
optimal stable matching4 in the matching problem (MT ,W T ;P T ) for each T ⊆ R.
The segregated matching σ is defined as
∀T ⊆ R, ∀xki ∈ SR, σ(xki , T ) = σ(xki ) = λ(xki , {k}) (10)
so that for any subset T , it assigns to each individual the women-optimal matching
obtained when matching each race alone. The segregated matching is clearly integra-
tion monotonic, but it fails to be stable when aggregating the individual societies.
The segregated matching even fails Pareto optimality, as the preferences in Example
2 shows.
Example 2: The segregated matching is not Pareto optimal.
ma : wb P (ma) wa wa : mb P (wa) ma
mb : wa P (mb) wb wb : ma P (wb) mb
I start by weakening stability and requiring Pareto optimality only. Can we
obtain always a matching that is Pareto optimal and integration monotonic? The
answer is that not even such weakening of optimality is enough.
Proposition 2. Not every IMP admits a Pareto optimal and integration monotonic
matching.
Proof. (Example 3) Let R = {a, b, c} and n = 3, and let agents’ preferences be
ma : wb P (ma) wc P (ma) wa wa : mb P (wa) mc P (wa) ma
mb : wc P (mb) wa P (mb) wb wb : mc P (wb) ma P (wb) mb
mc : wa P (mc) wb P (mc) wc wc : ma P (wc) mb P (wc) mc
Any Pareto optimal matching µ has µ(wa, {a, b}) = mb and µ(wa, {a, c}) = mc.
Therefore µ(wa, R) = mb by integration monotonicity. But exactly the same argument
for mb shows that he gets µ(mb, R) = wc. Therefore, no Pareto optimal matching
satisfies integration monotonicity.
Note that Chambers and Hayashi (2017) are always able to find a mechanism
that is Pareto optimal and integration monotonic, although not path-independent.
4I always pick the women-optimal stable matching to have a consistent selection from the set
of stable matchings. We could consider the men-optimal one as well. The selection problem is
not a big issue, as in large societies there is a unique stable matching whenever agents have short
preferences or the societies are unbalanced in their ratio between men and women (Immorlica and
Mahdian, 2005; Kojima and Pathak, 2009; Ashlagi et al., 2017).
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Therefore, the impossibility we obtain is stronger. A first conclusion is that achiev-
ing complete social integration is more difficult than obtaining complete economic
integration.
An immediate corollary follows, showing that if one is to pursue integration
monotonicity, there is no room for efficiency even in its weakest form.
Corollary 1. The only matching that satisfies integration monotonicity in every
IMP is the segregated matching.
Given the negative result obtained, let us focus on matchings that satisfy a more
flexible monotonicity condition, defined below.
Weak Integration Monotonicity For any race k ∈ R, and for every xki ,
µ(xki , R) F (x
k
i ) σ(x
k
i ) (11)
Weak integration monotonicity only requires that the corresponding matching
when all races have integrated is better than the segregated matching when all
societies are segregated. It says nothing about the relationship between matchings
obtained under partial integration.
This mild monotonicity is still inconsistent with stability, as our previous Example
1 shows. It can be combined with optimality, yet not without consistency problems.
Proposition 3. Every IMP admits a matching that is weakly integration monotonic
and Pareto efficient. If we add path-independence, we obtain an impossibility.
Proof. For any T ⊆ R, implement the matching σ. If the segregated matching is not
Pareto optimal, then implement a Pareto optimal matching µ that dominates σ, and
so on. Trivially, every agent is better off. Note that every agent has a veto power
over stable matchings that benefits others but hurt her/him.
To show that path-independence cannot be added, consider the society in Example
3. Let us merge societies into their colorblind equivalents: a and b into ab, and a and
c into ac. The unique Pareto optimal matching µ is such that µ(ma1, {ab, c}) = wb1,
but µ(ma1, {ac, b}) = wc1.
5. The Limits of Segregation
How many people prefer segregation over complete integration, provided that the
(women-optimal) stable matching will realize when societies merge? If there will be
a referendum asking whether all individual societies should merge, could it be that
segregation would obtain a majority of votes?
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Let us assume that everybody who does not get hurt by integration votes in favor
of it. In Example 1, half of the society votes against integration. Can it be more?
The answer is no.
Proposition 4. For any IMP (SR, PR), at most brnc agents prefer segregation. The
bound is tight.
Proof. Let us partition SR into three sets A, B+ and B−, defined as
A = {xki ∈ SR | λ(xki , R) = σ(xki )} (12)
B+ = {xki ∈ SR | λ(xki , R) P (xki ) σ(xki )} (13)
So A is the set of people who keep the same partner after integration, B+ are those
who prefer their “integrated” partner, and B− are those who prefer the “segregated”
partner.
Now consider the directed graph which contains all women from B+ and B−, in
which every woman points to the woman from whom she “stole” her new husband
in the integrated society, i.e. this is each woman wki points towards σ(λ(w
k
i , R)). A
cycle always forms whenever A 6= SR.
Now consider an arbitrary woman in B+, which must exist if A 6= SR because
λ produces the women-optimal stable matching. She points to a woman wlj, who
can either be in B+ or in B−. If she is in the latter, it must be that σ(wlj) is in
B+, because she proposed to him at some point in the woman-proposing deferred
acceptance algorithm but he rejected her. This goes on for any woman who is
worst off after integration: her previous partner must necessarily be better off after
integration, because he rejected her when she proposed to him in the deferred
acceptance algorithm.
It follows that |B+| ≥ |B−|, and thus |A| + |B+| ≥ |B−|, which implies that
always at least half of the society supports integration, completing the proof.
ma, wa
mb, wb
mc, wc
Figure 1: The procedure in the proof of Proposition 4 applied to Example 3.
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Proposition 4 is interesting because it tells us that a referendum for integration
will always be accepted by a weak majority. However, it could be that the voting
rule we need is a supermajority, that implements integration only if the number of
agents that get hurt from integration are at most a fraction  of the population.5
A natural conjecture is that, for large societies, integration is always approved in
any -supermajority, for any arbitrarily small . The conjecture is natural because,
when the number of agents grows, agents win a larger pool of potential partners
when social integration realizes. Stated differently, that the fraction of people that
reject social integration is vanishingly small when the societies become large. Yet,
this conjecture is false for small values of r. Looking at what happens when r is
small is particularly interesting because in reality we have only a few races.
Let (SR, PR) be an IMP in which each agents’ preferences are chosen indepen-
dently and uniformly at random from the set of possible strict preferences. Let Ωr(n)
denote the expected number of agents who prefer the segregated matching over the
women-optimal stable matching in the grand society.
Proposition 5. For r ≤ 5,
lim
n→∞
Ωr(n)
2rn
6= 0 (14)
We know that Ωr(n)
2rn
does not vanish from Monte Carlo simulations using Matlab
presented in Table 1.6 The code used is available from my webpage. I stopped
the simulations at 2n = 1000 because it already took three days to run in a high
performance computing facility (2n is the number of agents of each race). It is clear
from Table 1 that convergence occurs in all cases.
Table 1: How many people (in percentage) prefer segregation?
Average over a thousand simulations with preferences drawn uniformly at random.
r\2n 100 200 1000
2 25.42 25.76 25.47
3 25.43 25.83 25.99
4 24.84 25.14 25.57
5 24.30 24.60 25.05
Our Ωr(n)
2rn
≈ .25 is related to theorem 2 in Chambers and Hayashi (2017). Their
result states that when societies merge, the fraction of people who oppose economic
5Chambers and Hayashi (2017) use the equivalent concept of integration monotonicity under
P-vetoes, in which at most a group of people of size |P | may oppose integration. Both concepts are
mild versions of integration monotonicity.
6The code was run on the high performance computing facilities of the University of Glasgow,
and it uses the Matlab package to compute the women-optimal stable marriage, developed by S.
Gopalakrishnan.
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integration is always above one third under equal treatment of equals. Their result,
looking at a worst case scenario, is obtained in a very different fashion. The
comparison of our results suggest a second conclusion: it is easier to achieve partial
social integration than partial economic integration.
Using the same probabilistic IMP with random preferences, we can find the
expected welfare gains derived from integration. Applying the well-known result from
Pittel (1989) about expected rankings of partners in random matching problems, it is
easy to see that women get a higher ranked partner in expectation after integration
occurs, because
log(n)
(
rn+ 1
n+ 1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
exp. ranking w. segregation
− log(rn)︸ ︷︷ ︸
exp. ranking w. integration
=
n(r − 1)
n+ 1
log(n)− log(r) (15)
which is positive for all sensible values of r and n, meaning women get a partner
that appears earlier on their preference lists. Similarly, men get a better partner
after integration for sensible values of r and n, because
n
log(n)
(
rn+ 1
n+ 1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
exp. ranking w. segregation
− rn
log(rn)︸ ︷︷ ︸
exp. ranking w. integration
= A[(rn+ 1) log(r)− (r − 1) log(n)]
(16)
where A = n/[(n+ 1) log(n) log(rn)]. The gains from integration in an IMP with
random uncorrelated preferences are given by the sum of the previous expressions
multiplied by rn. The normalized gains from integration for a man and a woman
are depicted in Figure 2.
(a) r = 2 (b) r = 5
Figure 2: Individual gains from integration divided by rn, by gender
6. Who Prefers Segregation?
First let us look at the expected relative number of people who keep the same partner
after integration. Since the preferences are drawn uniformly, everybody has the same
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probability of matching an agent from their own race: this is 1/r. A natural guess is
that, among those, 1/2 of them do not change their marriage, which provides a good
intuition of the real numbers described in Table 2.
Table 2: How many people (in percentage) keep the same partner after integration?
Average over a thousand simulations with preferences drawn uniformly at random.
r\2n 100 200 1000 1/2r
2 27.26 27.14 27.02 25
3 18.39 18.23 17.89 16.66
4 13.93 13.62 13.41 12.5
5 11.31 11.21 10.84 10
Table 2 shows that, as r grows, the number of people who are indifferent between
integration and segregation becomes smaller. Since the proportion of people who
oppose social integration keeps relatively constant as described in Table 1, the number
of people who strongly prefer integration does grow, although as we saw it rarely
goes over four-fifths of the entire society.
Another natural conjecture is that the people who oppose social integration have
a lower expected desirability than those who do not. In other words, they are usually
ranked lower in the preference lists of the potential partners. And this new conjecture
is false too. Table 3 describes the expected rank of people who prefer segregation: it
is immediate that those who prefer segregation have the same expected ranking as
a random person, showing that people who prefer segregation are not particularly
undesirable agents, they are just like anybody else.
Table 3: Average rank of people who prefer segregation, by gender.
Average over a thousand simulations with preferences drawn uniformly at random.
r\2n 100 200 1000
women men women men women men
2 50.7 50.5 100.6 100.5 500.5 500.5
3 75.7 75.5 150.7 150.5 750.6 750.5
4 100.6 100.5 200.6 200.5 1000.7 1000.5
5 125.6 125.5 250.6 250.5 1250.6 1250.5
Finally, we look at the welfare losses suffered by those who prefer segregation
when integration realizes, in terms of ranking of their current partner. If their loss
was relatively small it would be a strong argument for saying that the impossibilities
described in Section 3 are basically irrelevant. Table 4 summarizes an interesting
result: the side of the society who does not propose, in this case men, get severely
hurt by integration for moderate values of n. Women, the proposing side, suffer a
moderate hurt at most.
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Table 4: Average welfare loss by people who prefer segregation, by gender.
Average over a thousand simulations. Welfare loss measured in difference in ranking of partners.
r\2n 100 200 1000
women men women men women men
2 4.9 19.7 5.7 34.9 7.4 136.6
3 5.4 27.4 6.2 49.2 7.9 193.8
4 5.7 35 6.5 62.1 8.1 250.8
5 6 41.8 6.8 74.9 8.4 303.3
Table 4 reveals that the welfare loss becomes smaller with respect to the size of
the grand society as n grows, suggesting that they become negligible in the limit.
This finding suggests that integration could be more easily implemented in large
societies.
The numbers in Table 4 should be understood as a lower bound for the welfare
losses, which would increase when agents are endowed with correlated preferences.
Correlation in preferences is evident for certain matching environments, like school
choice and marriage. We also assume that preferences are independent from race, an
ideal scenario but probably not the case in reality for many matching environments,
see Fisman et al. (2008) and Garcia (2008) for evidence of racial preferences for
dating and school choice, respectively.
7. Conclusion
When two or more communities integrate to match, there are always some people
that become worse off. If the final matching pattern is stable, integration is always
approved by a majority of agents, but the fraction of those that oppose social
integration does not vanish, even when communities grow large. The welfare losses
of those hurt by integration become negligible with respect to the size of the grand
society when communities grow large, suggesting that social integration is easier to
achieve in sizable communities.
Two interesting questions remain open. The first one is studying the limits of
social segregation in many to one matching. The impossibility results carry over, but
the question on whether more or less people get hurt by integration, and the exact
magnitude of the welfare losses, remains open.
Secondly, there is a recent literature that studies matching in the large using
cardinal utilities: e.g. Che and Tercieux (2015) and Lee (2017). Their formulation
of preferences makes it easier to introduce correlation, and can provide cardinal
measures on the welfare loss of agents that get hurt by integration. Although I
conjecture one would obtain similar results using their type of formulation, this
remains to be shown formally.
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